Dividend Policy and Investor Pressure

Main author: Driver, Ciaran
Other authors: Grosman, Anna
Scaramozzino, Pasquale
Format: Journal Article           
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id eprints-32996
recordtype eprints
institution SOAS, University of London
collection SOAS Research Online
language English
language_search English
description The economics of dividend policy has focused on the single tight narrative that dividends keep managers honest, mitigating concerns that they over-invest. This article provides a critique of that agency narrative, arguing that pressure from short-term focused investors, executives and board members pushes the firm into preemptive actions of returning too much cash via dividends. We analyze three channels of influence for investor pressure through 1) threat of takeovers, 2) shareholder value oriented corporate governance, measured by director independence and board equity incentives, and 3) trading and institutional ownership patterns. We find that firms adopt a higher dividend payout to discourage takeover bids. Also, FTSE 100 firms, that are most focused on shareholder value governance in the form of equity-based compensation and a higher share of independent directors, display a higher dividend payout. Frequency of trading and ownership by transient investors seeking current profits also predict increased dividend payout. Traditional agency theory, focused on dividends as a tool for managerial discipline, is not strongly supported by the results, which rather support a narrative of short-term investor pressure on firms irrespective of investment opportunities.
format Journal Article
author Driver, Ciaran
author_facet Driver, Ciaran
Grosman, Anna
Scaramozzino, Pasquale
authorStr Driver, Ciaran
author_letter Driver, Ciaran
author2 Grosman, Anna
Scaramozzino, Pasquale
author2Str Grosman, Anna
Scaramozzino, Pasquale
title Dividend Policy and Investor Pressure
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2020
url https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32996/