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id	eprints-34676
recordtype	eprints
institution	SOAS, University of London
collection	SOAS Research Online
language	English
language_search	English
description	Exploiting regulatory changes in China that govern the use of stock options, we investigate whether executive compensation affects acquisition decisions and post-acquisition performance from 2005 to 2014. We find that acquisitions are not driven by stock options. Managerial stock ownership promotes acquisitions at low levels of ownership – but leads to less frequent acquisitions at higher levels, implying a non-linear relationship. Similarly, we also find a non-linear impact of managerial stock ownership on long-term post-acquisition performance. However, neither stock options nor stock ownership determine short-term post-acquisition performance. Finally, state ownership has a significant impact on the compensation-acquisition relationship in that the above relationships only exist in private enterprises.
format	Journal Article
author	Jiang, Lin
author_facet	Jiang, Lin Kling, Gerhard Bo, Hong
authorStr	Jiang, Lin
author_letter	Jiang, Lin
author2	Kling, Gerhard Bo, Hong
author2Str	Kling, Gerhard Bo, Hong
title	Does Executive Compensation affect Firms' Acquisition Decisions? Evidence from China
publisher	Taylor and Francis
publishDate	2021
url	https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/34676/