| Summary: |
This thesis is a study of British Policy towards the Panjab between Hardinge's arrival in India as Governor-General and its annexation by his successor. The fundamental question to be answered is whether the British had a coherent plan to meet the problems posed by the lack of stability in the formerly useful buffer State between the Afghans and the British Empire in India. Policy was carried out through the North Western Agency and was much affected by the persons who held office there. Whether the Panjab was to remain an effective buffer State depended on the strength and disposition of the Darbar and the Chiefs. This in turn was affected by the Jagir and Revenue policies pursued by the British in the Jalandhar Doab as well as in the Lahore State. They have, therefore, been studied in some detail. The Summary Settlement and the other reforms accompanying it, which were effected after the Treaty of Bhairowal, in the Lahore State itself have been analysed. The consequences of their being effected by the British resident through the agency of British assistants when the old administrative machinery stood intact have been noted. The failure of policy as revealed in the course of the Second Sikh War has been traced. The circumstances that led Dalhousie to conclude that annexation was the only alternative left have been examined. The last Chapter in Cunningham's History of the Sikhs, which is a strong criticism of Hardinge's Policy towards the Panjab has been critically examined. The thesis has been written in the light of the Ripon, Peel and Broughton Papers in the British Museum, and of the Henry Lawrence and Broughton Papers in the India Office Library. Extensive use has also been made of the unpublished records in the India Office Library. |
