A Balancing Act: Managing Financial Constraints and Agency Costs to Minimize Investment Inefficiency in the Chinese Market

Main author: Yang, Junhong
Other authors: Alessandra, Guariglia
Format: Journal Article           
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id eprints-32624
recordtype eprints
institution SOAS, University of London
collection SOAS Research Online
language English
language_search English
description Using a large panel of Chinese listed firms over the period 1998–2014, we document strong evidence of investment inefficiency, which we explain through a combination of financing constraints and agency problems. Specifically, we argue that firms with cash flow below (above) their optimal level tend to under- (over-)invest as a consequence of financial constraints (agency costs). Furthermore, focusing on under-investing firms, we highlight that the sensitivities of abnormal investment to free cash flow rise with traditionally used measures of financing constraints, while for over-investing firms, the sensitivities increase with a wide range of firm-specific measures of agency costs.
format Journal Article
author Yang, Junhong
author_facet Yang, Junhong
Alessandra, Guariglia
authorStr Yang, Junhong
author_letter Yang, Junhong
author2 Alessandra, Guariglia
author2Str Alessandra, Guariglia
title A Balancing Act: Managing Financial Constraints and Agency Costs to Minimize Investment Inefficiency in the Chinese Market
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2016
url https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32624/