Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on CEO Employment Risk

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Main author: Yekini, Kemi
Other authors: Oscar-Chidioke, M O
Adegbite, Emmanuel
Format: Conference or Workshop Items           
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id eprints-32593
recordtype eprints
institution SOAS, University of London
collection SOAS Research Online
language English
language_search English
description This paper examines the determinants of CEO employment risk from a corporate governance (CG) perspective. Previous studies focused on the effect of CG on firm performance, we investigate the effect of CG on CEO’s employment risk. Using Probit model on a panel dataset from UK FTSE 350 non-financial companies, our results reveals that the likelihood of CEO employment risk increases as board size and board independence increases, while CEO network reduces the likelihood. The study advances CG literature by providing fresh insights into how CG mechanisms can enhance effective monitoring of CEO performance. It also offers important insight to policy makers who are interested in providing guidance on the optimal board size and board composition and those interested in the effective monitoring of CEO performance and organisational strategies for firm performance.
format Conference or Workshop Items
author Yekini, Kemi
author_facet Yekini, Kemi
Oscar-Chidioke, M O
Adegbite, Emmanuel
authorStr Yekini, Kemi
author_letter Yekini, Kemi
author2 Oscar-Chidioke, M O
Adegbite, Emmanuel
author2Str Oscar-Chidioke, M O
Adegbite, Emmanuel
title Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on CEO Employment Risk
publishDate 2017
url https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32593/

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