| Summary: |
This thesis initially reviews the current state of economic theory on the intra-household allocation of resources. It examines the 'game theory' framework within which the models are constructed, suggesting that such a framework, as yet, has been unable to deal with the complex combination of power, altruism, and trust that lead to the conflictual/cooperative nature of spousal relationships. It examines the problems of constructing indices of power, and suggests a way in which, in this particular case, some of the problems may be overcome. Using qualitative and quantitative evidence from Uganda, the thesis describes how bridewealth, division of household assets on death or divorce, attitudes to women earning an income and accumulating assets, and marital violence effect the financial relationship and the balance of power between spouses. Issues such as household budgeting systems, secrecy, female participation rates, and division of responsibility for household expenditure are seen as important elements of this relationship. Data collected on child nutrition is used to examine the impact that these factors have on child welfare. |
