id |
eprints-23333
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recordtype |
eprints
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institution |
SOAS, University of London
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collection |
SOAS Research Online
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language |
English
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language_search |
English
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description |
Almost three years after the onset of Ireland's banking criris public disenchantment continues to increase, aggravated in part by the government's failure to provide a transparent examination for the crisis and an endless stream of revelations on the increasing cost of stabilising the banking system. The government claimed that it acted on the "best available advice" and as a consequence has been able to pin the blame for the crisis on events beyond its control. This think piece argues that the government has long been uncomfortable relying on its own analysis and data. It argues that research available to the government from the Central Bank identified a serious funding gap facing the banking sector from as early as 2006. These dangers were not hidden on the banks' balance sheets as is often claimed.
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format |
Monographs and Working Papers
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author |
Tobin, Damian
|
author_facet |
Tobin, Damian
|
authorStr |
Tobin, Damian
|
author_letter |
Tobin, Damian
|
title |
Government Policy and the Banking Crisis: Vindicated, Misled or Flying Blind?
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publisher |
TASC: Think-tank for Action on Social Change
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publishDate |
2010
|
url |
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23333/
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