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Discretionary Enforcement and Strategic Interactions Between Firms, Regulatory Agency and Justice Department: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

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Main author:	Germani, Anna Rita
Other authors:	Morone, Andrea Morone, Piergiuseppe Scaramozzino, Pasquale
Format:	Monographs and Working Papers
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id	eprints-17704
recordtype	eprints
institution	SOAS, University of London
collection	SOAS Research Online
language	English
language_search	English
topic	HB Economic Theory
description	This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the U.S. environmental authorities’ (i.e., EPA and DOJ) behavioural mechanisms, based on strategic interactions among the players. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion). The purpose is to identify both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the DOJ’s and EPA’s optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. Consistent with the setting of the game theory models, the role of EPA and DOJ in deterring firms from polluting is, then, empirically tested, by means of a laboratory experiment. Laboratory evidence on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions predicted by the theoretical models set up is discussed for the different experimental treatments performed.
format	Monographs and Working Papers
author	Germani, Anna Rita
author_facet	Germani, Anna Rita Morone, Andrea Morone, Piergiuseppe Scaramozzino, Pasquale
authorStr	Germani, Anna Rita
author_letter	Germani, Anna Rita
author2	Morone, Andrea Morone, Piergiuseppe Scaramozzino, Pasquale
author2Str	Morone, Andrea Morone, Piergiuseppe Scaramozzino, Pasquale
title	Discretionary Enforcement and Strategic Interactions Between Firms, Regulatory Agency and Justice Department: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation
publisher	Centre for Financial and Management Studies (CeFiMS)
publishDate	2013
url	https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/17704/