White knights and black knights. Does the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies?
| Main author: | Mucciarelli, Federico |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Online access: |
Click here to view record |
| id |
eprints-14254 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
eprints |
| institution |
SOAS, University of London |
| collection |
SOAS Research Online |
| language |
English |
| language_search |
English |
| topic |
K Law (General) |
| description |
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them. |
| format |
Journal Article |
| author |
Mucciarelli, Federico |
| author_facet |
Mucciarelli, Federico |
| authorStr |
Mucciarelli, Federico |
| author_letter |
Mucciarelli, Federico |
| title |
White knights and black knights. Does the search for competitive bids always benefit the shareholders of “target” companies? |
| publisher |
De Gruyter |
| publishDate |
2006 |
| url |
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/14254/
|